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1Abstract
“Si él lo necesita” (if he really needs it) was the most common
argument given by the subjects who accepted the zero oﬀer in the
ultimatum game during experiments were conducted among illiterate
(adult) gypsies in Vallecas, Madrid. Interestingly the acceptance of
the zero oﬀer was not a rare case but, in contrast, it was the modal
value. This is even more remarkable if we consider that the 97% of
the subjects proposed the equal split.
Keywords: gypsies, fairness, social welfare, strategy method ul-
timatum game, bargaining.
JEL Class.: D63, D64, C93, J15.
21 Introduction
Questions regarding the foundations of human sociality have long been the
topic of social science research. Many authors from varying disciplines have
studied the driving forces behind individuals’ social behavior (see for example
Bateson and Shaw [3], Camerer [8], Kagel and Roth [17] and Rabin [20]).
Interestingly, experimental evidence suggests that the canonical assumption
of selﬁshness does not accurately represent individual behavior (see Henrich
[15] and Henrich et al. [16]). Bolton and Ockenfelds [4], Charness and Rabin
[9], Fehr and Schmidt [10] or Rabin [19] propose new models in which equity,
reciprocity or fairness substitute the standard selﬁsh behavior.
In all human societies a wide range of social phenomena is governed by
sets of norms that prescribe appropriate behaviors and sanction inappropriate
conduct. All populations have institutional rules which promote sharing or
fair transactions, albeit these vary according to the degree in which they are
stressed and the boundaries within which they apply (see Barth [2]). Authors
such as Henrich & Ensminger [14] or Henrich et al. [16] have studied the
inﬂuence that social context has on the behavior of individuals. Concretely,
they carry out an exhaustive analysis of this behavior in what they call “small
societies” and compare behavior among diﬀerent cultures.
The aim of this paper is to study concepts of fairness or equity in a speciﬁc
ethnic group: non-integrated Spanish gypsies. It should be noted that our
objective is to analyze the above concepts solely within and among gypsies.1
This paper is of interest for a number of reasons: (i)I ti sac o n t i n u a t i o n
of previous research in a very interesting population: Spanish gypsies. Al-
though the gypsy population in Spain is quite large, they have received very
little attention in economic terms due to the fact that they are marginalized.
Moreover they constitute an economic problem for the Spanish government.
(ii) The views held by Spaniards about gypsies is contradictory. Gener-
ally, non-gypsy citizens have a very negative concept about this community.
The Spanish Racial Discrimination Report (see Díez—Nicolás [7]) shows that
a large percentage of Spaniards reject gypsies (nearly 90%). Many reports2
reveal that the majority of Spanish society holds negative stereotypes regard-
ing the gypsy community. Some of these stereotypes such as the gypsies’
1We only compare intra-gyspy behaviour in an attempt to avoid such problems as
racism, apprehension or feelings of unsafety and mistrust that may arise when the game
is played against another ethnic group.
2See for example the FSGG [11] report of 2004.
3tendency to live on the fringes of mainstream society or to be asocial, racist
and so on are of a “permanent” kind (they have existed for a long time) .
Other stereotypes can be considered to be "temporary" (for example, their
involvement with drug traﬃcking). But not everything that gypsies do is
deemed negative. Indeed, there are some ”positive” characteristics associ-
ated with them, namely their artistic skills such as ﬂamenco dancing or their
extraordinarily strong family ties and group solidarity.
The latter is of particular interest to us here given that the results ob-
tained from our Strategic Method Ultimatum Game show that gypsies share
the money and are willing to accept very unfair oﬀers. In other words, they
are inclined to share their proﬁts with other people who belong to their group.
(iii) Finally, this paper continues cross-cultural research in western coun-
tries. Speciﬁcally, we introduce the CORE package in Spain. This type of
experiment has typically been conducted in underdeveloped countries of Asia,
South-America or Africa. In contrast, we reproduce part of the CORE pack-
age in Spain; a developed country which is a member of both the EU and
the OECD. Hence, it is very interesting to analyze behavior in a “small
community” living within the context of a European country.
In sum, this paper examines the Strategy Method Ultimatum Game
played among gypsies in Vallecas. Our aim is to study two measurements
of behavior: (ﬁrst) the sense of fairness (or altruism) and the fear
of direct punishment and (second) direct punishment (sanctions for
inappropriate or unfair behaviors). In Section 2 the experimental design
and procedures are described. Some features of the population are examined
in Section 3, while results are shown in Section 4. Finally the analysis is
enlarged upon in Section 5 and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Experimental design & procedures
Design
The research was conducted following part of the CORE package guidelines
from the Cross—Cultural Analysis (see Henrich and Ensminger [14]). Specif-
ically we used the Strategy Method Ultimatum Game (SMUG hereafter) as
well as an extensive survey included in that package. The standard SMUG
is as follows: players A and B are allotted a sum of money. Player A has
to decide how to divide it between himself and Player B. Before hearing the
4oﬀer, Player B must set an “acceptable oﬀer range”. If Player A‘s oﬀer falls
within this range, Player B receives the oﬀer and Player A gets the remain-
der. If A‘s oﬀer is outside this range, neither player receives anything (the
money disappears). Experimental evidence shows that this oﬀer range takes
t h ef o r mo fam i n i m u ma c c e p t a b l eo ﬀer (hereafter MAO; see Gurven [13]),
although in some groups individuals will reject even large oﬀers.
Observe that we obtain two diﬀerent measures of individual behavior:
from player B’s responses (speciﬁcally when they are in MAO form) we can
infer how willing individuals are to punish others’ unfairness at a cost to
themselves. On the other hand, from player A’s behavior we can obtain a
combination of preferences for fairness or fear of direct punishment (strategic
behavior). From post-game interviews we can determine whether or not
player A’s response is given out of a pure sense of fairness.
As we will see below (see table 1), the survey explores several individual
attributes such as personal features, labor issues, social integration and so
on. The survey includes several questions related to the game that players
are asked to answer after playing. Speciﬁcally:
• Proposers were asked to answer the following questions: (#1)¿ Q u él e
recordó el juego del ultimátum con relación a la vida real? (Did the
ultimatum game remind you of anything related to real life?) (#2)
¿Por qué hizo esa asignación? ¿Por qué no más, o menos? (Why did
you give that amount? Why not less or more?) (#3)¿ C r e eq u el a
mayoría de gente habría aceptado menos? (Do you think most people
would have given less?)
• Recipients were also asked about the previous item (#1) and: (#2)
¿Cómo se hubiera sentido si hubiese recibido una oferta de 0C =d e l
Jugador 1? (How would you have felt if you had received an oﬀer of
0C =f r o mP l a y e r1 ? ) ;( # 3) ¿Cómo se hubiese sentido si hubiera recibido
u n ao f e r t ad e1 0 C =? (How would you have felt if you had received an
oﬀer of 10C =?),
In order to gain further knowledge about this particular population we
enlarged upon the standard procedure in two ways: (i) Once the subjects
h a da n s w e r e dq u e s t i o n1 to 3 we added another item: they were asked to
play the opposite role (hypothetically). The proposers were then asked about
acceptation rates and the recipients were asked about divisions; (ii)A tt h e
5end of the experiment —once the subjects had completed both the experiment
and the whole CORE survey— they were asked (in a hypothetical situation)
a b o u ti n e q u i t ya v e r s i o nu s i n gt h ed e v i c ep r o p o s e db yK r o l l&D a v i d o v i c h
[18], that is, subjects were asked to choose between a equal (but unknown)
premium and an individual (but unknown) premium. As we will see below,
i plus ii provide us with some interesting insight into the question at hand.
Procedures
The entire experiment was conducted in July 2004 at the “Asociación Barró”
School for Adult Education. Run by nuns, the main goal of this school is to
teach illiterate adults to read and write. The school is located in Vallecas,
one of the poorest districts on the outskirts of Madrid, Spain.
Participants were students from the school who came voluntarily the day
of the experiment. Although the school is located in Vallecas, the subjects
were from Santa Catalina, a shanty town outside Madrid. They were invited
to “participate in an investigation in which they could earn some money”.
The experiment was conducted by the 3 authors3 plus 6 volunteers who
helped to do the survey. It was conducted as follows.
• First, all the subjects received the instructions orally in one room.
Each subject also received the 3C = show—up fee and was assigned an
identiﬁcation number.
• Second, the subjects were randomly asked one by one to go to another
room where PBG conducted personal interviews which included the
game. Real money was placed on the table to explain each case to
both recipients and proposers. The examples were repeated until they
were fully understood by the subjects.
• Third, subjects went to another room where AD, with the help of the
6 volunteers, conducted the full CORE survey.
• Fourth, RCR performed the inequity aversion device subject by subject
at the back of the room.
3Pablo Brañas—Garza (PBG) read the instructions and conducted the SMUG indi-
vidual by individual, Ramón Cobo—Reyes (RCR) ran the inequity aversion device, while
Almudena Dominguez (AD) coordinated the whole survey with the help of the 5 vounteers
nuns.
6• Last, PBG did the matching and then each subject received the money
privately in a sealed envelope.
Given that we were more interested in getting data from the recipients
rather than the proposers, we decided to use a simple mechanism: all subjects
with an identiﬁcation number that was a multiple of 3 would be proposers,
while the remaining players would be recipients. To facilitate the matching
process, we used the following rules: the two numbers4 following each multi-
ple of 3 would be the recipients of its previous multiple. Hence subjects #4
and #5 were the recipients of #3; subjects #7 and 8 were the recipients of
#6 and so on). However for the proposer to earn the money, his only relevant
partner was the following subject (i.e. #4 for #3, #16 for #15, etc.).
The experiment lasted more than an hour. The subjects’ average and
modal earnings were 5C =p l u s3 C = for the show-up fee. This amount of money
is approximately equal to the daily salary they earn selling scrap metal (the
main occupation of about 45% of the population).
3 Study population: Gypsies living in slums
outside Madrid
There are approximately 600,000 gypsies currently living in Spain. The
largest gypsy community, some 300,000 gypsies, or half of the entire pop-
ulation in Spain, live in the region of Andalusia . Let us now describe some
social norms and features that distinguish this ethnic group.
Gypsy society as a whole is structured around extended family units.
Individuals belong to a single unit. Gypsy society has no written rules.
Instead, the entire set of social norms is transmitted orally from generation
to generation. Thus the older members play a key role in the society and
are looked up to by the whole population who hold their experience and
knowledge in high esteem. These subjects are considered “references” for the
community. Moreover, the older members hold authority over the younger
members of the society as do men over women.
Three basic social rules govern gypsy society:
4Obviously, in the case of subject number 2 there is only one number which is paired
with 1. Of course, these devices were not public information. We also used subject 26 as
a proposer to introduce some “noise”.
7• solidarity among gypsies. This can be classiﬁed into two main obli-
gations: hospitality and aiding others; including giving ﬁnancial sup-
port to other gypsies.
• freedom as a natural condition of the people.
• symbolism as a representative feature of gypsy culture. This includes
ﬂamenco, which is considered to be an expression of gypsy lifestyle.
The points above are applicable to the entire population of gypsies liv-
ing in Spain. We shall now describe some features of the population that
regularly attend classes at “Asociación Barró”.5
The gypsies who attend the school are, on the whole, very young. Few are
older than 65. The family constitutes he basis of their educational, economic
and social structure and is normally larger in size than non-gypsy families.
Although most of the students at “Asociación Barró” are originally from
S a n t aC a t a l i n a( as l u mo u t s i d eM a d r i d ) ,m a n yo ft h e mh a v eb e n e ﬁtted from
subsidized housing provided by the autonomous government of Madrid and
have moved out of the area. Others, however, have remained in the Santa
Catalina settlement or are squatters.
Although gypsy children generally receive schooling, absenteeism and
dropout rates are very high 6.T h e s ea l a r m i n gﬁgures can be explained by the
phenomenon of "exclusion" occurring in the south-east area of Madrid where
the Asociación Barró is located and where there is a large concentration of
pupils with learning diﬃculties.
More than 50% of the adult population is illiterate. Thus many of them,
especially women and older members, do not have stable employment and
must do unskilled work such as selling ﬂowers, fruits and vegetables or clothes
in the marketplace or collecting and selling scrap metal, etc... Although gyp-
sies have become the target of a public program to improve their precarious
situation, their relationship with the State is a complex one. While in some
cases they will accept public protection such as housing (aid that they be-
come very dependent upon), in most cases they prefer to have nothing to do
with public authorities, especially the police.
5The following 3 paragraphs summarize an interview conducted with Blanca González,
one of the volunteers who works in Barró.
6The Plan against Social Exclusion in Madrid reports rates of absenteeism to be as
high as 48.7% during the period of compulsory education.
8Their relationship with other races is also complicated. The gypsies hold
many stereotypes and largely reject people of other races such as Arabs or
Orientals. This is probably due to a certain amount of competitiveness
between the poorest sectors of society. Their relationship with payos (non-
gypsy Spaniards) has historically been one of clashes and confrontations. To
quote Blanca: “They don’t see eye to eye”, “They have always turned their
backs on one another”.
From the CORE questionnaire we selected the most 40 relevant items
for urban populations in Western countries. Table 1a and 1b summarize the
main ﬁndings for the 38 subjects who participated in the experiment (M*
means missing data). Table 1a below shows the percentage of the population
having the selected attribute.
Insert table 1a about here
Table 1b analyzes the average of some numerical attributes.
Insert table 1b about here
As shown, 73% of the population is married and 86% has children. The
mean number of children per family is close to 3, even though the mean age
of the population is very low (28.79). 93% of population has some level of
education. While this percentage may seem quite high, it is interesting to
note that gypsies consider learning to read and write an indicator of having
achieved a certain educational level.
On the whole, the population is very poor. Only 1 out of 38 subjects is
a homeowner and none owns property. The existing evidence suggests that
home ownership provides people an anchor in the community they would
not otherwise have (see Glaeser & Sacerdote [12]). This anchor motivates
individuals to be more cooperative, generous and fair. Indeed, our results
show that although the subjects do not own a house, they behave in a very
altruistic way.
Cooperative institutions. 15% of the population does volunteer work in an
association and dedicates about 1 hour per week on average to this activity.
24% are club members and spend around 5 hours per week at their club.
9Networking. We observed that the mean number of guests that come for
lunch in gypsy homes is higher than 57.T h i sﬁnding, together with the fact
that the mean number of siblings is 6 (a very high number compared to the
overall Spanish mean of 2.7 ), may be of great help in understanding the
“sharing” behavior shown by the players.
4 Results
Recall that the players are going to play two diﬀerent roles. The results of the
regular task (i.e. the standard SMUG) are summarized in column 2 of Tables
2 and 3. In column 4 of Tables 2 and 3 we show the results of the role reversal
in which individuals switch their roles (but only in a hypothetical way), that
is, former proposers play the game as recipients and former recipients play
the role of proposers. Finally we analyze if both samples arise from the same
population. The results after merging the samples are shown in Column 6 of
Tables 2 and 3.
Proposed divisions and acceptance rates
Column 2 in Table 2 shows the divisions proposed by the 14 gypsy subjects
who played as player A in the SMUG.
Insert table 2 about here
The result is clear: proposers do not take advantage of their position and
only one of them proposes an unfair division. What is even more surprising
is the overwhelming percentage of proposers who oﬀered an equal split: more
than 90%. To sum up:
Result 1: The percentage of subjects oﬀering an equal split is overwhelming
(93%).
7In Blanca’s words: They prefer “to live day by day”. Proof of this lies in the fact
that gypsies always cook for many people (more than what is needed for the inhabitants
of their household). If food is not ﬁnished, it is given away and never kept. This can
probably be explained by their nomad ancestry.
10Why did they choose the equal split? Recall that we asked the subjects
some questions during the experiment. Item #2 inquired as to why subjects
made such a division. The only subject who did not choose the equal split
did not give an answer. The remaining subjects gave such explanations as
fairness (11 out of 14 subjects) and strategic behavior8 (2 individuals).
In contrast, item #1 asked subjects if they associate their role in the
SMUG with any real situation: 4 of them considered their role to be unfair;
3 mentioned sharing rules, whereas the remaining subjects made reference to
gambling (3), TV programs (1) or business dealings (3).
Hence, we can conclude that fairness motivates equal splits.
Column 2 in Table 3 shows the Minimum Acceptable Oﬀer (MAO) for
the 24 gypsies who played as recipients.
Insert table 3 about here
It is striking to note that about 30% of the population accepted any
amount greater than 1C =, while it is even more surprising that 25% of the
subjects accepted the zero oﬀer.
The explanations that these 6 subjects gave regarding their behavior are
very interesting indeed. They said that they accepted a zero oﬀer because if
the proposer did not share, it was because he or she needed the money. They
also remarked that it was better for the proposer to keep the entire amount
of money than to lose it all!
Result 2: Driven by solidarity and utilitarian criteria, 25% of the subjects
accepted the zero oﬀer.
L e tu sh i g h l i g h ts o m eo ft h ea n s w e r sg i v e nb ys u b j e c t sd u r i n gt h ee x -
periments. Item #1: 10 subjects (out of 24) did not associate their role in
the SMUG with any real situation; 4 considered their role to be unfair; 3
mentioned sharing rules whereas the remaining subjects made reference to
gambling (3), TV programs (1) or business dealings (3).
Thirteen (out of 24) subjects admitted that they would not be happy
with the zero oﬀer (item #2) , while only one considered such an oﬀer to be
an oﬀensive division. In contrast, only 7 subjects stated that they would be
happy if the proposers gave them the whole endowment (item #3) and 10 of
them said that they did not like this advantageous division.
8One of them admitted: “Everybody here will accept an equal split; in contrast, to use
another more advantageous division would be very risky”.
11Role reversal
As we mentioned above, subjects were asked to hypothetically play the oppo-
site role. Column 4 in Table 2 shows the oﬀers proposed by former recipients,
while the same column in Table 3 shows the acceptance rates for former pro-
posers.
We have used non-parametric tests to check if both samples arise from the
same population. Fortunately, the answer is yes for both the divisions [Mann—
Whitney (z =1 .30,p=0 .73) and Kolmogorov—Smirnov tests (z =0 .21,p=
1) do not reject] and the acceptance rates [neither the Mann—Whitney (z =
−0.77,p =0 .46) nor the Kolmogorov—Smirnov tests (z =0 .84,p =0 .47)
reject].
Data are drawn from the same population. Hence, we are able to merge
samples. Column 6 in both Table 2 and Table 3 respectively shows the
population values for divisions and acceptance rates.
While the percentage of subjects oﬀering an equal split is even larger than
in the original case, the most striking result is that after merging samples,
zero became the modal of acceptance rate!
Hence we can conclude that fairness criteria is not symmetrically dis-
tributed: while there is a large percentage of subjects accepting very unfair,
even zero, oﬀers, the percentage of subjects proposing the equal split is over-
whelming. To summarize:
Result 3(main): The equal split is not solely the modal proposal, but is
used by 97% of the subjects. In contrast, gypsies are willing to accept
completely unfair oﬀers including the minimum modal oﬀer of zero.
The former means that subjects are completely fair when they are asked
to share some amount of money. However, the latter illustrates that they are
also willing to accept completely unfair divisions!
5 Further analysis
What determines MAO?
We used both contingent and non-parametric analyses to check if some of the
previous socioeconomic variables reported in Table 1 may explain possible
variations in the acceptance rate. Recall that this analysis has no bearing on
12the proposed division because all 97% subjects proposed the same distribu-
tion: 50-50. The results are summarized as follows:
• Educational level, economic variables (home ownership, labor condi-
tions, etc.), religiosity, family characteristics (number of siblings, eat-
ing customs), social integration (friends invited home, trust, volunteer
work) do not explain MAO.
• Interestingly, inequity aversion (measured by the Kroll & Davidovich
[18] device) does not explain this individual threshold.
• However, both club membership and gender have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the minimum accepted oﬀer.
Let us ﬁrst analyze the eﬀect of club membership.T a b l e 4 s h o w s t h e
main descriptive statistics of subjects who are club members and those who
a r en o t . W h i l et h eM a n n — W h i t n e y( z = −1.70,p =0 .08) test rejects the
null for α =8 % , the Kolmogorov—Smirnov tests (z =1 .13,p =0 .15)d o
not. Therefore we do not have strong evidence of diﬀerences in behavior as
a result of club membership. In fact, subjects who do not belong to any club
are willing to accept smaller oﬀers. Speciﬁcally, club membership doubles
the fairness criteria. This result seems to be contra intuitive.
Insert table 4 about here
Let us now turn to the question of gender eﬀect. Table 4 above also gives
the main descriptive statistics for both males and females. Once more the
Mann—Whitney (z = −1.83,p =0 .06) test rejects for α =6 % ,w h i l et h e
Kolmogorov—Smirnov tests do not (z =1 .03,p=0 .23). Hence our statistical
evidence is not strong. Interestingly, males are willing to accept reduced
oﬀers, while the fairness criteria for females is twice that of males. Figure 1
below shows these discrepancies.
Insert ﬁgure 1 about here
Clearly, the theoretical prediction (the zero acceptance) holds true for
half of the males (6 out of 11), while it is not true for the majority of females
(18 out of 23 claim positive values). Speciﬁcally, the modal value for females
changes to 2C =. In sum:
Result 4: Both club membership and female gender double fairness criteria.
13Inequity aversion among gypsies
P r i o rt oc o n c l u d i n go u rp a p e r ,w ew o u l dl i k et oe x a m i n es o m eo ft h ec o m -
ments made by the players when they performed the mechanism proposed by
Kroll & Davidovich [18]. Although these will not be studied from a statistical
viewpoint, we felt them to be particularly illustrative of this population.
For those subjects who preferred to try their own lottery (51% of 37
subjects, 1 missing), that is from those individuals who are not inequity
averse, we extracted the following remarks:
• “mi suerte es mia ¿no?” (my luck is mine, isn’t it?)
• “lo mejor es que cada uno a su suerte ¿no?” (the best thing is for each
of us to try our own luck, don’t you think?)
• “sería injusto que, porque ella tuviese mala suerte, los demás com-
pañeros tuviesen mala suerte también” (it wouldn’t be fair if just be-
cause she’s unlucky the rest of us have to be unlucky, too.).
In contrast, those subjects who preferred to get the same unknown out-
come as the rest of the population (that is, inequity averse subjects) we
observe:
• “mejor que todos lo mismo, ¿no?" (it’s better if we all get the same,
isn’t it?)
• “mejor todos los mismo y así no nos enfadamos entre nosotros, porque
si uno se lleva más, el otro se puede enfadar” (It’s better if we all get
the same. That way nobody will get mad because if somebody gets
more, the others could get angry.)
Note that these subjects all said “no?” at the end of the sentence. They
did this to seek our approval, to simply try to be nice or to get the right
answer. Although these remarks are merely illustrative and the survey was
hypothetical, we thought it would be of interest to include them in this
section of the paper.
146 Discussion and concluding remarks
Although our results are quite remarkable, it is important to note that the
percentage of subjects choosing anomalous values is very low. Bahry and
Wilson [1] hypothesize that “atypical intervals of rejection” may be due to
fairness or confusion. In our study there are a very low number of possible
confused subjects (2 recipients + 2 role-reversal recipients out of 38 individ-
uals). Given the hyper-fair behavior we observed in 97% of the cases, we can
assume that our subjects were not confused.
We observed two contradictory behaviors in the two diﬀerent decisions
that the subjects took. When individuals had to decide how to divide the
money, they proposed an equal split. This decision is due to the individuals’
sense of fairness; a question that has been studied by authors such as Fehr
and Schmidt [10] or Bolton and Ockenfels [4].
In contrast, when individuals have to say the minimum value they accept,
the modal acceptation is zero. Given that this division of the money is not
fair, the subjects’ decision is not taken out of a sense of fairness.
In our opinion, these two contradictory behaviors can be explained by a
sense of solidarity and social welfare.
In the ﬁrst decision, the subjects proposed an equal division of the money.
The reason for this is that they are morally obliged to distribute the money in
a fair manner. This sense of morality could be due to the fact that they have
a large number of siblings, that many guests are invited for lunch everyday
and that many of them do volunteer work (see Table 1 for an overview of the
population features).
In the second case, individual decisions are not driven by the same sense
of fairness. Using experimental individuals’ arguments we ﬁnd a possible
explanation for this behavior. Sentences such as “if he needs the money...”
o r“ h ei sm o r en e e d yt h a nm e ”l e a du st ot h ef o l l o w i n gc o n j e c t u r e :subjects
will accept even the most disadvantageous distribution because they believe
that if another subject does not respect the “sharing rule” it is because he or
s h ei sm o r en e e d y .
Hence, as our survey pointed out, they do not feel oﬀended. They just
think that if the proposer oﬀers zero it is because he needs the money. There-
fore they should accept it!.
Arguments such as solidarity also come into play. Brañas-Garza [5] be-
l i e v e st h a ts o l i d a r i t yw i l lb eg r e a t e ri nc a s e sw h e r et h ec o u n t e r p a r ti sm o r e
needy. Note that when subjects consider that their partners really need the
15money, the only way to ensure that the other individual will receive the pay-
ment is by choosing the interval [0,10]. In this case, the subject will get the
amount the other does not need. In the ethnic group studied here, solidarity
is related to the gypsies’ social norms. As we explained above, solidarity is
one of the main features of the value system of this population, particularly
helping other gypsies ﬁnancially. Hence, individuals are socially obligated
not to punish other gypsies. Our results show that this social norm is, in
fact, observed by these actors, thus explaining the players’ two contradictory
behaviors.
Although we observe clear signs of solidarity, we may also suppose that
lexicographic preferences play a relevant role in individuals’ behavior9, i.e.,
individuals will accept even unfair divisions because they want to maximize
their social welfare regardless of how the money is actually distributed (with
this strategy they minimize the probability of both players obtaining zero).
Last, our analysis shows that variables related to education, economic
standards (home ownership, labor conditions, etc.), religiosity, family (sib-
lings, eating customs), social integration (friends invited home, trust, volun-
teer work) do not explain MAO. We also ﬁnd that while inequity aversion has
no eﬀe c to nM A O ,b o t hc l u bm e m b e r s h i pa n dg e n d e rv a r i a b l e sd o . S p e c i f -
ically we show that club membership and being a female doubles fairness
criteria. Thus females and club members are not willing to accept very un-
fair divisions.
To sum up, individuals will demonstrate fair behavior when deciding how
to divide the money. Nonetheless, when subjects must decide about the
minimum amount of money they will accept (MAO), this behavior will change
depending on their sense of solidarity and their desire to maximize their social
welfare (lexicographic preferences).
9The lexicographic preferences are deﬁned in R2as follows.
x= (x1,x 2) ∈ R2
y= (y1,y 2) ∈ R2
xºy
½
x1 >y 1 or
x1 = y1and x2 ≥ y2
¾
For the particular gypsy: x1 = expected social welfare and x2 = individuals’ payments
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18Table 1.a: Population Features I
Attribute % M* Attribute % M*
female 68 0 married 73 1
some level of education 93 1 lives with his partner 67 5
part-time job 64 27 has children 86 3
gypsy boss 0 34 was born in Spain 100 0
homeowner 3 4 was born in Madrid 63 0
does not own a watch 64 0 was born in a rural village 18 5
no satellite television 87 0 head of the family 54 3
does not own a radio 24 0 the family eats together 16 0
does not own a car 70 0 houses with guests 54 1
property owner 0 0 thinks they live in a safe home 74 0
unemployed 83 15 club member 24 4
religious 75 2 volunteer worker 15 5
goes to church 59 9 distrustful of people 56 2
goes to school 65 0 inequity averse 49 1
19Table 1.b: Population Features II
Attribute Mean M* Attribute Mean M*
age 28.79 1 number of children 2.57 8
school attend./years 3.6 13 number of brothers 6 0
hours worked/week 24.6 28 position among brothers 3.84 0
gypsy colleg./job 15.3 35 people living in a house 4.76 0
church attend. days/month 21.61 20 guests for lunch everyday 5.73 16
20Table 2: Proposed Divisions
Original Role-Rev. Both
Divisions Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel.
10.0 00 00 00
9.1 00 00 00
8.2 00 00 00
7.3 10 .07 0 0 1 .03
6.4 00 00 00
5.5 13 .93 24 1 37 .97
4.6 00 00 00
3.7 00 00 00
2.8 00 00 00
1.9 00 00 00
0.10 00 00 00
Total 14 1 24 1 38 1
21Table 3: Minimum Accepted Offer
Original Role-Rev. Both
Intervals Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel.
s ∈ [0,10] 6 0.25 5 0.36 11 0.29
s ∈ [1,10] 2 0.08 3 0.21 5 0.13
s ∈ [2,10] 7 0.29 0 0 7 0.18
s ∈ [3,10] 3 0.13 2 0.14 5 0.13
s ∈ [4,10] 4 0.17 1 0.07 5 0.13
s ∈ [5,10] 0 0 1 0.07 1 0.03
Others
s ∈ [4,6] 1 0.04 0 0 1 0.03
s ∈ [2,8] 0 0 1 0.07 1 0.03
s =[ 5 ,5] 1 0.04 1 0.07 2 0.05
Total 24 1 14 1 38 1
22Table 4: MAO: Gender and Club effects
n Min Max Mean St. Dev.
Club Member 70 5 2 .72 .0
Not Club Member 24 0 4 1.31 .3
Female 23 0 4 2.01 .4
male 11 0 5 1.01 .6
23Figure 1: Acceptance rate by gender
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